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Bahrain's oil-producing  economy  is vulnerable  real consumption.  Such austeiity  would  not be
to terms-of-trade  shocks  for oil in the short to  necessary  in a growing,  efficiently  restructured,
medium run. But the country's dependence  on  and diversified  economy,  in which the real
nonrenewable  hydrocarbon  resources  represents  exchange  rate policy  played  a key role by
a more  basic const!aint  on Bahrain's  prospects  stimulating  non-oil  tradable  sectors that could
for long-term  economic  growth  and welfare.  To  replace  oil when  it dries out. But the success  of
maintain  economic  growth  and welfare  in the  real exchange  rate depreciation  itself depends  on
post-oil  era, Bahrain  must save more  of its oil  a sufficiently  high savings  rate, to free up
revent-zs  and assets and use them to invest  resources  to switch to the production  of other
abroad  and to support  economic  diversification.  tradables.
Elbadawi  and Majd derive  optimum  Elbadawi  and Majd  present  an empirical
domestic savings  rates for Bahrain  in the context  three-sector  model  of the real exchange  rate,
of a two-assets  (oil and non-oil)  intertemporal  which permits  links between  the equilibrium  real
welfare-maximizing  model. Based  on these  exchange  rate and the optimum  savings  rate.
derived rates,  they recommend  that the current  They use this model to compute  what real
suboptimal  savings  ratios  be raised  by about 10  depreciation  is required  cnnsistent  with the
percent  of GDP.  derived  optimum  savings  ratios.
Achieving  such a high savings  rate is  Their model  predicts  that a real depreciation
probably  not economically  feasible  or politically  of about 31 percent would  be needed between
sustainable  in a stagnant  economy,  because  it  1992  and 2005 to avert serious  real
implies significantly  reducing  absolute  levels of  overvaluation  over this period.
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The mainstay  of the economy  of Bahrain  is provided  by the oil and gas sector  which
accounted  for almost  70 percent  of total exports  over the 1986-90  period,  more  than  60 percent  of
government  revenue  and  more  than 18 percent  of GDP. Furthermoro,  government  expenditure
(provided  for by the oil revenue)  influences  non-oil  GDP  through  its effect  on infr.structure  and
services  sectors,  the two  main  components  of the Pon-oil  GDP (see  figure 1).1  The country's
dependence  on the nonrenewable  hydrocarbon  resource  base,  however,  imposes  a fundamental
constraint  on Bahrain's  prospects  for future  economic  growth  and welfare. Except  for the unlikely
event  of major  new  discoveries,  the country's  oil reserves  fields  will dry out in about  the next  fifty
years  if the curren rate of exaction is mained  in the future. 2
It is now  widely  understood  that  in countries  where  the mainstay  of the economy  is a
depletable  resource  base (oil),  the oil extraction-and  hence  current  national  income-reduces  future
national  income. So an excepionaJly  sizeable  part of oil sales (national  income)  must be saved  and
allocated  to future  income  generating  (domestic  and foreign)  assets,  in order  to sustain  the same
standard  of living  in the post-oil  era as well.'
The implication  of this analysis  for Babrain-and  other  oil dependent  economies  for that
matter-is  qute dramatic. It is shown  below  that  for Bahrain  to be able  to mainuin  its standard  of
living  ater the oil era and  to restructure  and  develop  a viable  no-oil  based  economy,  it may  have  to
achieve  a high  domestic  saving  rate  over the remaining  years  of the oil economy. The initial  levels  of
the required  saving  rate  could  be as high as 50 percent  of GDP,' before  declining  to normal  levels  at
I  Mor  detals  on BDarn's  eow  dsibution of outqpt  And  fcl  opert  we  provided  in tls  1-3  of dte follovwing
2 Curmn  pr  at  the  on-shor  fields  is  at 42,000  b  while d8i  of  die off-shore  Abu Sadf  fields  is  at  72,000  b/d,
swe  Sm-ton il-2 ad  Appendi  (A) for a precie  descipto  of the expet  profile  of fut  oi extraction  in Bahorain.
$e  liteatur  on optimal  ntional saving  under  irreproducible  resou  bas  econmy includes:  Dervis, Malin and van
W  brgea (1984), Gdb (1985ab), Farzin (1989), and Askai  (1990),  to metion a few exampl.
4 As we will  se  below,  however,  over  Iho  first  bf  of the 1980s,  acua natonal  sving was  not  far b8ow die 50%  rte.-2  -
the time of the extnction of the oil reserves.  The aainme  of this saving rate (or something  close
to it) should be the most important  objective  of Babrain  development  strategy. Tho achievement  of
such a high saving rate, however, is likely to be economically  infeasible  and politically  unsustainable
in a stagnant  economy, since it will imply significant  reductions  in the absolute  levels of real
consumption. Such austerity will not be necessary  in a growing economy  in which the incentive
structure is allowed  to shift resourmes  to the comparative  advantag sectors, and hence to facilitate  an
efficient  restructuring of the economy.
Once adequate  resources in the economy  become available as a result of sufficienty high
national  saving, the key variable that determines  efficient  resource  allocation across sectors is the real
exchange rate (RER).  To give a simple generic definition  of the RER, it is convenient  to view
Bahrain as an economy  composed  of two sectors, tradables and nontradables. 'The  tradables are
commodities  which are traded in the international  market or are close substute  for inrnstionally
traded goods; for a given set of nominal exchange rate and commercial  policies, the prices of traded
goods are detemined by inernational prices.  Oil, machinery, and alumimnm  are example  of taded
goods in Bahrain. The prices of nontaded goods on the other hand, are determind by the conditions
of domestic  supply and demand. Examples  of such goods are construction  and housing or haircuttery
services. The RER is defined as the relative index of the aggregate  price of nontradables  to the price
of tradables.
An appreciated  (high) RER means that the strucure of incentives  in the domestic  economy  is
probably biased  against the tradables and in favor of the nontradables. if this appreciatd RER is in
fact high enough relative to its equilibrium, then the RER is also overvalued. An overvalued  RER
discourages  the production  of tradables and helps expansion  of the nontraded  goods sector, while at
the same time it makes traded goods relatively  cheaper and hence it encourages  more imports and
further reduction of exports.  Therefore, RER overvaluation  can substanially worsen the current-3-
account  deficit. Moreover,  its nt  spedig  offect  may  reduc, domstdc  sing  and may  also lead  to
reduced  growth  for open  eonomies which  have  strong  potntl  for eaport  eopasion or efficint
import  subsdtudon.  Clearly  given  its need  to generate  a higher  domesdc  savg  rate in a growing  and
a more  diversified  economy,  Bahrain  can  il afford  an overvalued  RER.
From the above  discuion  It is obvious  that an adequ  macroconomic  fmework  for
Babrain  should  ingre  the two  ndment  conpts  of the optmm  (desired)  savg  rate and  the
equilibrium  real echange rate (IR).  Section  II provides  a brief  review  of recent  macroeconomic
policy  and  national  saving  in Bahrain,  whilo  section  m gives  the derivation  of opdmum  saving  rates
and compares  them  with  the observed  hisorical  rates. Section  IV discussea  a model  of ERER
determinaton  that  relates  the ERER  with trade  balance  among  other  findamentals.  Two simple
spications  rdated to ths model  wil then  b  estimad using  annual  Bairain daa.  One
specification  esdmates  the long-run  det  --mnation  of the IER,  while  the other  etmates the short-
run dynamics  of the RER. In Section  V, the lons-run  estimated  specfication  will  be used  to generate
an index  of ERER  conistent with 'desired'  saving  rates; in turn the derived  ERER  wiUl  be compared
with  the observed  to compute  RER  misaigmen  Furtmore  the dynmic equation  wiUl  be
eployed to suggest  a future  nominal  ex  g  rate  pa  for Bahrain,  given  projected  RER
misalignment.
Finaly Section  VI concludes  by providing  an oudine  of a st iteg  on how  to achieve  RER
depreciation  and  avert  RER overvaluation  in Bahrain. The discussion  will cener around  the trade-
offs between  commercial  policy  and devaluation  as instuents  for validating  the depreciation  of the
RER  triggered  by e  axp  tu  reducing  macroconomic  policies. In this regard  the key role of
cutting  the fiscal  deficit  and reducing  governen  expendure - especialy  current  exenditure - wil
be emphasized.  Also  this section  will include  a brief  discussion  of the issue  of RER stability. It will-4 -
be argued  that  RER  depreciation  called  for by the evolution  of the ERER  is wt necesarily
incompadble  with stability of the RER.Figure  1: BAHRAIN
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H. Recent  Macroeconomic  Policy  and Natonal Sa  ving In B_arain (1980-90)
Bahrain  is a small  open  economy  domnated  by oil and  gas. The non-oil  economy  is largely
driven  by a large  public  sector,  mainly  through  govrnment  budgetary  expenditure. In recent  years
the authorities  have  initiated  a series  of economic  diversification  effrts  aimed  at developing  an
export-oriented,  energy-intensive  muf  g  sector  based  on dometc natural  gas resources,
fostering  an ofwhore  financial  center  by opening  of some  80 offshore  banks,  improving  the country's
infrastructure,  and  bringing  on stream  the Aluminum  Bahrain  (Alba)  smelter.
A summay of Babrain's  macroeconomic  developments  over the past decade  is provided  in
Table  (1) (a more  detailed  account  of the evolution  of the economy  over the period 1980S-O  is
contained  in Appendix  Tables  (A.1)  and (A.2)). During  much  of the 1980s,  the increased  oil revenue
has made  it possible  for the goverment  to finace higher  public  expenditure  progams while  at the
same  time  being  able  to enjoy  surpluses  in both  public  sector  accounts  and etetna  current  and
overall  positions,  despite  higher  imports. During  this  period,  the economy  has prospered  with  high
growth  rates  of the real GDP and  improved  standard  of living.
By 1989,  however,  the already  weaking  world  petoleum  prices  resulted  in an erosion  of
Bahrain's  financial  and economic  positions. The overall  fiscal  account  retured to a deficit  by as
much  as 11  percent  of the GDP  while  the eten  curent accoUnt,  excluding  official  grants,  recorded
a sizable  deficit  of around  6 percent  of the GDP. But  in 1989  GDP  grew  by 2.5 percent  before
decerating to 1.2 percent  in 1990. Although  the value-added  in the hydrocabon  sector  expanded  by
4.3 percent,  the official  estimates  indicate  that  the real  non-oil  GDP  rose  by only  0.2 percent,  mainly
due  to sharp  contracdons  in the financial,  insurance,  and  transport  and  communication  sectors. The
real  GNP  growth  rate increased  by 9.5 percont.
During  1989-90,  domestic  consumption  as a perentage of the GDP  declined  by almost  2
percent,  from about  64 percent  in 1989  to around  62 percent  in 1990  and  the fixed  capital  formaion-7 -
of the prlvae..  sector  fell by 1.5  percent. While  the gross  domestic  savings rate as a percentage  of the
GDP increaed by more  than  2 percent,  from  about  36 percent  in 1989  to 38 percent  in 1990,  it was
far below  the average  saving  rate  of around  50 percent  during  the first half of the 1980s.
Furthermore,  a closer  look  at the evolution  of domestic  savings  in Babrain  shows  how  the
country's  savings  efforts  have  deteriorated  durzng  the 1980s. 'ihe severe  plunge  in the government
saving  rate, from about  22 percent  of t9 GDP  in 1980  to less  than  6 percent  in 1990,  seems  to be the
major  factor  behind  the worsening  of the overall  domestic  saving  situation  in Babrain.
In the socond  half of the 1980s,  the government  revenue  from oil and gas declined  sharply  as
the world  market  prices  for oil fell. Meanwhile,  the non-oil  revenue  as a percentage  of the GDP
increased  by more  than  2 percent,  from about  9 percent  in 1985  to more  than 11  percent  in 1990  (see
Table  1). However,  the govnment current  expenditure  remained  relatively  high,  at about  30
percent  of the GDP  during  1988-90,  to erode  much  of the positive  impact  of the higher  non-oil
revenue  on the government  savings.
The evolution  of domestic  savings  in Babrain  would  be depicted  better  if we compare  the time
trends  of the private  vis-a-is public  sector  savings. Figure  2 shows  that  the private  savings  has been
more  or less  procyclical  during  much  of the 1980s. During  the boom  periods,  the private  saving  rate
as a percentage  of GDP inreased whereas  during  the periods  of slump  it followed  the suit and
declined. For example,  during  the recessiczary  period  of 1981-82  the ratio  of private  savings  to GDP
was at its lowest  point  (about  29 percent)  whereas  in 1983  and 1988,  when  the economy  was
expanding  rapidly,  by more  than 8 percent  and  7 percent  per anmnm  respectively,  the savings  rfte
reached  its peak  of more  than  35 percent  of %Lz  GDP.
On  the other  hand,  the government  savings  appears  to have  been  countercyclical.  During
1981-82,  when  the economy  was in recession,  the government  savings  was at its maximum.  In 1983,
the saving  rate declined  to almost  13  pacent of the GDP  when  the rate  of growth  of the GDP  was 8.5-8 -
percent. In 1988,  it reached  its lowest  point  of about  2 percent  of the GDP, when  the economy  was
expanding  by about  7 percent. However,  the government  eavings  coninued  to incroase  when  the
accelerating  pace  of the economic  growth  reversed  in 1988-90.  In addidon,  increases  in the
government  current  expenditures  have  been  the main  source  of investmnt, but also  public  sector
deficit  since  apparently  it remined unmatched  by increased  revenues.  By the late 1980s,  the budget
deficit  increaed sharply  and  reached  to about  11 percent  of the GDP in 1987  and 1989  and  9 percent
in 1990  while  the share  of the public  sector  fixed  capital  formation  in GDP  plummeted  by more  than
3 percent  from about  12  percent  in 1985  to a litde  over 8 percent  in 1990.
In more  rocent  years,  Babrain's  balance  of payments  position  has deteriorated  despite  positive
resource  balance  manly provided  for by improvements  in the terms  of trade. The current  account
deficit,  excluding  official  capital  grants,  reached  6.5 percent  of the GDP  in 1989  and 5.6 percent  in
1990. As Table 1 shows,  the slight  improvement  of the current  account  deficit  in 1990  can somewhat
be attributed  to the sharp gain  in the purchasing  power  of oil exports  [PPE  measured  >
(I O;lPt")  *Oil  E1x  .rt Volume  Index]  in that  year. Nonetheless,  the decade  of the 1980s  has
witnessed  an erosion  of the purchasing  power  of oil exports  as the PPE  index  (1985- 100)  fell from
about  150  in 1980  to about  95 in 1990.
Table  1 also shows  the dependence  of the Bahrain's  economy,  especially  the country's  foreign
trade,  on oil.  As  can be seen  from  the table,  throughout  the period 1980-90  the non-oil  trade  balance
as a percentage  of the GDP  has been  negative. Similarly,  during  the same  period  Bahrain's  net factor
income  and current  transfer  payments  have  been  negative,  reaching  20 percent  of the GDP  in 1990.
Together  with  the non-oil  trade  balance,  these  two items  have  accounted  for a large  portion  of the
current  account  deficits  in recent  years. To eliminate  the adverse  effects  of the BOP  deterioration  in
the second  half of the 1980s,  the authorities  had to recourse  to a policy  of drawing  down  on9
ioternational  reserves while sekdng official capital grants from the neighboring  oil-rich countries
(rabie (A.2)).
Such a policy, while being effective in the short run will be ill advised as a long-run strategy,
especially  given the county's  short-lived  on-shore oil raserves which under the most optimistic
scenario would not last longer than 15 years.  The need for higher savings rate for Bahrain appears  to
be more pressing today than anytime  before because  the country's present national savings  rate of
about 20 percent is by far less than the similar rate in other oil-producing  countries', let alone the
'optimum' or 'desired' saving rate (see below).Table  (1)
Summary  of  Nacroeconomic Indicators
in  Bahrain
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  19a8  1989  1990
fP Growth Rate  (X)  -6.6  -7.5  8.5  4.9  -2.0  1.6  -1.2  7.3  2.5  1.2
Total  Revenue and Grants  38.5  41.2  40.4  34.9  34.8  38.2  35.5  35.8  31.8  32.5  33.9 Oil  and Gas Revenue  28.2  30.6  29.4  23.3  24.1  26.9  20.5  20.7  16.6  18.4  20.9 Non-Oil  Revenue  5.4  6.1  6.9  8.3  8.1  8.6  11.8  11.9  12.2  11.3  11.2
Total  Expenditures  27.4  29.2  34.6  38.1  36.0  35.7  39.8  38.2  38.2  36.8  36.6 Surplus  or  Deficit  (-)  11.1  12.0  5.9  -3.2  -1.2  2.4  -4.3  -2.3  -6.4  -4.3  -2.7 Consolidated  Public  Debt  (X  GDP)  8.4  7.8  8.1  8.4  8.8  7.6  11.4  13.9  20.2  20.3  14.8
Gross  Domestic  Savings  55.0  52.7  48.5  47.6  45.4  46.1  40.6  41.2  38.2  36.1  38.3 Govern1nent Savings  21.9  23.4  18.6  12.6  13.1  14.2  7.4  6.9  1.9  3.4  5.6
Export  Price  Index  (1985=100)  106.9  118.4  117.9  106.2  95.1  100.0  58.2  68.7  65.5  74.9  88.6 Non-Oil  Inport  Price  Index  104.9  105.3  103.7  101.4  99.2  100.0  117.9  129.5  138.9  138.0  !45.8 Manufacturing Real  Wage  Index  171.9  172.2  139.0  131.0  137.3  100.0  115.0  127.7  152.1  150.2  133.7
Terms  of  Trade  105.3  107.3  106.3  102.8  97.6  100.0  88.3  93.3  96.5  101.1  100.7 Nominal Effecive  Exchange Rate  100.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Reel  Effective  Exchange Rate  78.2  86.5  96.9  100.5  102.0  100.0  81.4  70.4  64.6  65.4  60.1
Oil  Export  Volume Inedx  130.4  145.1  109.4  101.4  111.8  100.0  138.5  137.3  135.5  138.7  14.3 Purchasing  Power of  Ot Exports  150.4  139.1  156.6  80.0  105.8  100.0  100.4  89.8  53.8  57.4  95.2
Oil  Trade  Balance  (X  UDP)  38.4  39.3  34.8  30.3  29.5  29.9  25.5  23.3  22.2  24.0  28.5 Overall  Trade  Balance  (X  GDP)  10.0  11.3  11.3  3.5  3.0  5.6  4.1  6.5  9.8  5.3  14.5 Current  Account Balance  (X  GDP)  6.0  12.4  11.7  2.7  5.6  1.0  -2.2  -6.3  5.7  -3.6  6.2 .............  ..................  .............. _  ..............  ...................................  _............................................  ....................  ...........................................  _....  ...  . ... Source:  Govermeent  of  Bahrafn.
/1/  Defined  as  (Mage/PXatm 4"EER).  where  Wage is  the  index of  wages  In manufacturing sector,  PXalm is  the  unit  vatue  index  of  aluminum  exports. NEER  is  the  irdex  of  nominat eff  ective  exchange  rate.Figure 2: BAHRAIN
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An 'optmm'  or 'desired' saving rate relative to the GDP4has  been computed  at about 37%
fbr countries which only partially depend on oil such as Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia;  for other
counties that are more heavily dependent  on oil such as Saudi Arabia and UAE the computed  saving
rate can be as high as 60%.5 The ftamework used in such derivations is a small open economy
opdmizing  model comprising  of two assets(oil  and non-oil).  he optimum saving rate can be solved
as an explicit function  of: the life span of the oil reserves, expected  future oil prices and real return
on investment,  as well as the desirable saving rate in the post oil era.
The model used here is adapted and revised version of Fanzin (1989). A detailed formal
sttmnent of the model is contained  in Appendix  A.  The model's sojation allows the derivation  of
opmum  saving rates subject  to the following  specific assumptions:
(1)  A flxed extraction  rate for Abu Saafa oil field for the first 1  years then declining  by
6%.  Immediately  following  the base period (1990), a declining  extraction  rate at 6%
for the on-shore oil fields.
(2)  The on-shore oil fields' reserves are assumed to last for 15 years, while that of Abu
Saafa are assumed to remain productive for 50 or for 85 years.
(3)  Oil prices are assumed  to remain fixed in real terms.
(4)  The real rate of return on investment  are assumed  to be 2%.
(5)  The optimal  post-oil domestic  saving rate is set equal to 25% or 30%.
The 50 years assumption  about  the life span of the oil reserves in Abu Saafa  reflects more or
less the best available knowledge  about the technology  of production in the oil sector of Bahrain. The
85 years assumption  is merely considered  for comparison,  therefore, only the 'optimum' saving rates
For  exampl sme  Dervis, Marti  and  von  Wijaberge  (1984)  for die cas  of Egypt, Puzin (1989)  for Kuwait,  ad  Admi
(1990)  for Saudi  Anbia.- 13  -
based on the 50 years assumption  will be used in the subsequent  ERER analysis. Finally the
assumptions  about the real rate of return and post-oil saving rates follow the ones suggested  in similar
studies (such as a recent World Bank study on IJAE).  The former is based on international  rates of
return on investment,  while the later is based on the average rate of domestic saving prevailing  in the
developed  countries.
The alternative  estimates  for the domestic  saving rates are presented in Table 2 and are also
shown in Figure 3.1 These estimates  are based on various sets of the parameter values stated above.
The time path of the saving rates are traced for 10-year  intervals.  Comparison  of columns (2) to (3)
and (4) to (5) confirms that, other things equal, the larger the post-oil saving rate, the higher the
initial optimal  saving rate.  The same comparison  also shows that everything  else being equal, the
shorter the reserve life, the higher the initial  optimum saving rate and the faster it approaches  the
post-oil  saving rates, however, in this case the differential  in initial domestic  saving is rather
marginal. These two outcomes  appear consistent  with a more risk averse attitude  towards future
income and consumption  flows and/or a stronger preference  for the welfare of future generations  over
the present generation  (i.e. a lower discount  rate of time preference).
The optmum saving rates profile we will select for further analysis in this paper is the one
based on 50 years life span of off-shore  oil and 30% post-oil national  saving rate (column  4 of Table
2).  In 1980  for example, Babrain's actual saving rate was close to 55%.  A comparison  of this
optimal savings  rate (column (4) of Table 2) with the actual saving rate in Bahrain (rable  1) shows
that over the second half of the 1980s  the domestic saving rates were not sufficiently  high to be
within the optimal  range.  Over the first half of the 1980s,  the actual saving rates were close to the
optimal,  however.  The rates declined  sharply during the second half of the 1980s,  primarily due to
6O  N  toht  this modl does not acount for net fiaor payme  and net  ,andfu,  in thee  h  at national  saving  rat is
equivaet to domeslic  ssving  raft.- 14-
depressed  oil prices and revenues. Thhi  highly suboptimal  level reflects the fact that the authorides
chose not to adjust  expenditure  to levels consistent  with the lower oil revenue.  On the contrary, the
government  contnued to subsidize  consumption  at the expense  of savings, particularly by spending
generously  on social and economic  services. By the year 1990, the domestic saving rate (Table 1)
fell sharply to about 39 percent of the CDP from about 55  percent in 1980.  Clearly, given such a
sub-optimal  savmg rate, lower aregate  consumption,  but more imporanly,  higher economic  growth
will be needed for Bahrain to maintain  a comparable  standard  of living for future generations.
Consequently,  the government fiscal policy needs to be adjusted  to bring down the level of
public expenditures. Ihe  high level of fiscal deficits of about 11 percent of the GDP during t!ie
pedod 1987-90  (the year 1988  is an exception)  appears  not to be sustainable  in the future.  Given the
fact that in Bahrain  an adequate  tax instrument (other than trade taxes) is virtually noneistent,  it is
important  for the govermnent  to save and accumulate  non-oil  capital assets out of the oil windfalls
dunring  the boom peiods  to bring the present sub-optimal  domestic  saving rate closer to the optimal
saving ratio, initidly esdmated at about 48 percent.- 15-
Table 2: Time Path of Optimal Saving Ratio
(Percent of GDP)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Parameters  T=85,r=2%  T-85,r=2%  T=50,r=2%  T=50,r=2%
Time  PPs=30%  PPs=25%  PPs=30%  PPs=25%
t-  0 (1990)  48.2  44.5  48.4  44.7
10  46.6  42.9  46.8  43.2
20  39.6  35.4  39.9  35.8
30  35.3  30.9  35.7  31.2
40  32.9  28.2  33.3  28.7
S0  31.5  26.7  30.0  25.0
60  30.8  25.9
70  30.5  25.5
80  30.3  25.3
85  30.0  25.0
Dte:  - eieof  e  oil reserve
r  *  the real rate of return
Pps  - Post-oil domestic saving rate
Fgure  3:  Babraim:  lime  Path  of Optnmal  Saving Ratio
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IV. The Empirical Model of the RU
Consider an economy  producing  three typos of goods, nontradables  (N), oil exportables  (x)
and importables  (m), the prices of x. and m, being  tradables goods are given by: 7
(1)  P 0 =  Px  *  (1-t,,)
(2)  P  =  Pm * E ( 1 + t,)
where P  stands for the internationally  determined  foreign prices given in US dollars, E is the nominal
exchange  rate in BDIUs$, and t,,  and t.  are the corresponding -jeign trade tax rates. now let the
price of nontraded  goods be given by PN  and let G and Y stand for nominal aggregate  government
expenditure  and nominal GDP, respectively;  then define domestic absorption  A as follows:
(3)  A= GDP + M - X
now we can state the equilibrium  condition in the nontraded  goods market where
the demand  for nontraded goods  DN  is set equal to the supply  SN.
(4)  DN  (P.,  Pm,  PN,  A) =  SN  (P2, P.,  PN, Y)
' For the  can of Babruin  we could  have  coniderd  a fiuter diuaeption  of exprs into  oil  (xo)  aN non-oil,  but  lack
of d  on an aegte  nooil  export  prico  index  prcludd that.- 17 -
The solution  of condition (4) using (1)-(3)  gives the expression  for the ERER where the RER is given
by PN/PT,  and PT is the weighted  index  of P.,  and P,  (see for example  Rodriguez (1989); Elbadawi
(1992); and Edwards (1989)).
Pxo  G  M-X
(5)  ERER=ERER  (Pm  (  Y  Y J
where the signs in parenthesis indicate  the signs of ERER  partial derivative  relative to its arguments.
According  to the above  equilibrium  condition, the RER should depreciate (RER to decline)  as
the trade deficit declines (or the trade surplus increase). The reason is straightforward:  a larger trade
surplus  means a reduction in spending relative to income. At least some of the reduction must fall on
nontraded  goods so their price must fall (so the RER comes down). Subject to plausible assumpdtions
regarding investment  n Bahrain, the trade balance  can be shown to be directly related to the saving
rate, which means that a higher saving rate is not sustainable  without  RER depreciation  (See Section
V below).
An increase in overall government  spending  for a given trade deficit ratio ((M-X)/Y)  must
imply  that government  share in total spending  has increased  at the expense  of private spending. In
this case an increase in c/Y will lead to an RER appreciation  (depreciation)  provided that the
government  propensity  to spend on nontraded  goods is higher (lower) than that of the private sector.
This accounts  for the fact that the sign of the G/Y effect could not be detrmined a pricri. Also the
domestic  terms of trade for oil exports relative to imports  (  px*)have  indeterinate  signs
depending  on their relative weights in the construction  of RER.  As can be seen from equations  (1)-
(2) above, this indicator  reflects the joint effects of the international  terms of trade  *  and the
PO- 18 -
tax policy  on foreign  trade. In Bahrain,  however,  the first factor  basicaly  accounts  for all of the
movement  in the domesdc  tradables'  price ratio. As an empirical  regularity,however,  governments
tend  to have  higher  propensities  to spend  ia tne nontraded  goods  sectors;  and in the case  of a
dominant  export  sector  like  oil in Babrain  a large increase  in its price  relative  to imports  or other
exports  will generate  significant  spending  effects. So that  an increase  in aggregate  government
spending  rate or the relative  price of oil is likely  to lead  to an RER appreciation.
IV.  I An Econometric  Model  for Babrain
In what  follows,  we estimate  a linear  logarithnic  version  of equation  (5) above  using  annual
Bahrain  data for the 1975-90  period. As we mentioned  in the introduction  to this  paper, we will
interpret  equation  (5) above  as describing  the long-run  evolution  of the equilibrium  RER for given
'sustainable'  values  of the fiudamentals.'  The estimation  results  of equation  (5) are presented  in
equation  (6). A dynamic  specification  of RER short-run  behavior  was also  estmated (equation  (7)),
using  an error-correction  framework.'
The  RER data  is the  IIM muldlateral  index. 10 The Appendix  Table  (A.3)  contains  the data
on the RER  and its fundamentals  used in the esdmation  of the ERER  model  (equation  (6)),  and  the
corresponding  error-correction  equation  (7).
'  jusdficaion of die above  inepretadion requirmesd  th  e individual  variaMes  hat  ter  into tio equation  becointegrated
(e.g. Edwards  (1989) and Elbadawi (1992), pp 14-24).  The relaively short leong of tho dat  prhclud  fonad  teat  for
coifgtion.
91f *a  c_oeasng  retonsi  exist,  Egl  and Grnger  (1987) dsow that it is also c  _ot with a  dynmic error-
correction  medl
to  Ihe RER multila  index is defined as the noninal effetve  exchang rae  id  adut  for relive  moveme_  in
naional  price or  cost iicators  of the home county  ad  its paum  - or competoor  - countrie.- 19  -
(6)  logEpR  -0.° 037R  D  +  0.66  lo
(-3.70)  (8.86  ~  m
(5  36)  loZ  a)  4  t0)  (-X/
R2 - 0.73,  P  - 0.67,  DW-  1.41
(7)  Alog  ARC - 0  39)  (log  E:AE:R- - log  RER. )
+  &  log  (p)
+334)  (  it  (0.63)  (A
_  A3  A log  (IZER)e
pa  - 0.88,  P  - 0.83,  DW-  1.39
where t-statistics  are in parenthesis  and NEER stands for nominal effective  exchange  rate.  Despite
the rather small sample available  to us, the esdmation  results are fairly satisfactory,  and broadly
corroborate  the predictions  of the theoretical  model.
Starting with equation (6), the esdmated  regression explains over 73% of the variation in
RER.  The terms of trade for oil relative to imports  has a statistically  significant  and positive effect
on the RER with an elasticity  of 0.66; ceteris paribus, a tporaril  improvement  in the TOT for oil
exports by 40% (say) can lead to about a 26% real overvaluation. This is because  the oil boom will
increase government  revemne  and therefore allow for further government  spending, which in turn
leads to higher private sector domestic absorption. The net effect is a higher demand  for both traded-20-
an nontraded  goods, and since the prices of traded goods are given and the price of nontradables  goes
up, an RER appreciation  will ensue.  The appreciated  RER will encourage excessive  importing while
the domestic  production of imports  and other minor exports will be further marginalized. The non-oil
trade deficit will widen and possibly  even the aggregate  trade balance may deteriorate. This result
also imply that a medium to long run worsening  of the TOT will require an equilibrium  real
depreciation.
Hence the economy will be in its weakest  condition when suddenly the TOT for oil move to
the other side, as it did in Bahrain; where it improved significantly  over most of the first half of the
1980s,  but only to worsen substantially  over the second half.  Clearly in this case the observed
expansion  in aggregate  spending  over the first period is not sustainable, and the RER appreciation  is
not called  for by a change in the ERER. An oil price (or quandty)  boom is also likely to have a
deleterious  effect on other minor exports-through  the same spending effect channel.  This effect is
known in the literature as the 'Dutch Disease' effect." 1 In terms of our model, this influence  of the
oil price boom could be reflected by the influence  on the ERER of the relative price of oil to other
non-oil  exports (or potential exports).  In Babrain  the most important  non-oil exports are
.anufacturing,  especially alumimum.  The already very small sector of agriculture  may have also
been negatively  impacted as well. 12
The ratio of aggregate  government  expenditure  has a positve elasticity at 0.61%.  The
implication  of this result is that the government  in Bahrain-as  in many  other countries-tends  to have a
higher propensity  to spend in nontraded  goods compared  to the private sector.  Excessive  and
' 1 On Dutch-disease  laure  see, for examplo,  Corden (1981), Cordon and Neay  (1982), Neay and van Wijnbergen
(1985), Huaberger  (1981), and  Buiter and  Purvis (1983).
'IMe  mafsaion  of this effect  on  gijculaure  is vividly refleoed in the expansion  of the nontnded housing  sector  at the
expense  of horticulural  land in Greater  Manama. For the given technological  and microeconomic  incentive  conditions  in
Bahrain  today, the prevailing  RER and the flow of cheap  sad mosdy suidized  agicultuanl  imports  . der agriculture  to be
unattractive  compared  to the service sector.- 21 -
unsustainable  government  expenditure,  therefore, leads to RER appreciation  and overvaluation. If the
requirement  of increasing  the domestic saving rate requires a permanent  cut of 10% (say) in the ratio
of government  expenditure  to the GDP, our model  suggest  that this will lead to about 6% depreciation
in the ERER.  Cutting  the fiscal deficit and reducing  government  unsustainable  expenditure  are
obviously very important  for achieving  a higher saving rate and improved trade balance,as well as
averdng  RER  overvaluation.
The composition  of government  expenditure  matters,however. It has been argued that
government  development  expenditure  or government  expenditure  on capital goods tends to be traded
goods-intensive;  hence the brunt of the cuts should be borne by current government expenditure. In
fact Martin (1991)  shows that a reduced share of government  expenditure  on capital goods-as  part of
a fiscal retrenchment  program in Bangladesh,  have had an appreciationary  effect on the RER in that
country. Furthermore, from an economic  growth perspective,  a reduction in government expenditure
on capital goods especially  in key areas such as infrastructure,  can substantially  weaken  the supply
response in the economy  and hence compromise  the prospects  for future economic  growth.  Finally
and as expected,  the trade deficit ratio has a statistically  significant  and highly appreciable  positive
effect on RER  with a semi-elasticity  equal to 2.45%.  In the following  section, the resource balance
(and government  expenditure)  are linked to the optimum saving rates, derived in Section m above.
In addition  to the TOT relative prices - which are exogenous, this linkage allows the derivation  of
sustainable  ERER fundamentals  consistent  with the optimum (or desired)  saving.
Second, we consider the error-correction  equation  (7) which gives the short-run dynamic
aspects  of the RER  determination. Here also the results strongly supports the error-correction  model,
with the effect due to the error-correction  term,  (log  1RER - log  ER)  ,,  esdmated at 0.39
(positive  and less than one) and is highly significant. If the fundamentals  in the previous period calls
for a lower RER  than the observed i.e.  log  ERERt-I  - log  RERn,  < 0:  then since the coefficient- 22 -
is positive, the RER will depreciate (decline)  in the following  period. This estimate of automatic
adjustment  (0.39) for Bahrain is much larger than the estimate  of 0.19 obtained  by Edwards (1989)
for a group of developing  countries  using a partial adjustment  model. Even though Edwards' method
is different from ours, the comparisons  suggests  that automatic  adjustment  in Bahrain is much more
effective than the average for developing  countries. The estimated  coefficient  suggests  that it takes
only 4.6 years to eliminkie  90% of an exogenous  shock in Bahrain." 3
The coefficients  of the different fundamentals  reflect the impact  of transitory changes  in the
fundamentals  on the rate of change of the RER.  The capital  flow and TOT have positive and highly
significant  short-run effects on RF.R. The remaining  fundamental  (G/Y), however, has positive but
statistically  insignificant  influence an RER.  Another potential  short-run effect on RER is represented
by the excess of the rate of growth of domestic  credit over the growth of real output. This variable  is
a proxy for macroeconomic  policy (e.g. Edwards (1989))  and should lead to RER appreciation. In
our case, and as expected,  this factor has a positive but very insignificant  effect, however, and was
subsequently  dropped from the final equation in (7).
Finally, we consider the effect due to the rate of change in the nominal effective exchange
rate (in BDMUS$).  In theory, starting from initial  conditions  of RER misalignment  and for given
macroeconomic  policy and exogenous  fundamentals,  a nominal exchange  rate depreciation  should
accelerate  the process of RER adjustment  towards its equilibrium  level.  Our results strongly support
this role for the nominal exchange  rate for Bahrain. Our model predicts that, ceterus-paribus,  a 50%
effective nominal  depreciauvn  leads to about 40% real depreciation. This unusually  high efficiency
estimated  for nominal depreciation, is consistent  with the country's long history of low and stable
T1he  numberof  years  to clear  10096  of an exogenousshockdrtough  'automaic  adjustment'  alone  canbecompuedfrom
the formula: (1- oc)  =  (1  - 0.  39)  r,  where  T is the number  of years. This  fonnula  can be obtained  by nmnuating the
error-correon spefication in (7).-23 -
inflation. Since  the Bahrain dinar is pegged to the dollar, this result implies that a depreciating dollar
will substantially  enhance the country's external  competitiveness. 1'
V.  Optimum  Domestic Saving, the ERER and Real Misalinment in Bahrain
The ERER index is derived by using the estimated  model of equation (6) above and measures
for 'sustainable' fundamentals. Starting  with the historical  period (1977-1990),  the following
assumptions  are made in calculation  of the data on 'sustainable' fundamentals.
(a).  Historical  Period (1977-1990):
(a. 1)  Given the exogeneity  (to the Bahrain economy)  of the terms of trade, we take the
sustainable  values  for these two indicators  to be the five years moving  averages of the observed data.
(a.2)  The 'sustainable' capital flow ratio-proxied  by  M-p,  is linked to the saving rate
through the domestic  saving investment  gap:
(8)  M-X,  I  - Sd
GDP  GDP  GDP'
where domestic  saving is exclusive  of net factor payments and net transfers.  This linkage between
domestic  saving and the resource  balance is the hallmark of this exercise.  To generate  consistent
resource balance, we use actual historical  G  data and an adjusted  Gd  data on identity
GDP  GDP
(8).  As we noted in Section (E)  above, the historical saving rates were close to average optimum
rates for the first half of the 1980s. Over the second half of the 1980s, however, historical saving
1  To infer from  dibi esuk whedher  or not a realignmen  of cuency  will be appropriat  in he cse  of RER miaignment,
depends  on the extent  to which such  a policy could lead to destbilizing expectaions  dht may undmine dte stability  of the
Snancial system.- 24 -
rates have dropped from about 46% in 1985  to around 39% in 1990 (see Table 1).  Accordingly,  the
historical  saving rates for 1988-90  have been adjusted  to gradually approach  the optimum  rate
obtained  for 1990. Finally a five years moving average of the residual,  G  ,  is computed  and
used as a measure  sustainable  capital flows."
(a.3)  Abstracting  from the complexities  of the terms of trade effects and thereby calculation
of the gross domestic income, we have simply  derived consistent  data on the government  expenditure
by exploiting  the basic national  income identity:
(9)  Cg  = 1  __CSC (9)  p  ~~~Sd
GDP  GDP  GDP'
where C, and Cp  stand for government  and private consumption,  respectively. Here, we use the
C
acuala  historical  data on  s  in addition to adjusted domestic  saving rates in the above identity  to
obtain  CS  as a residual.  Then a five years moving  average for the ratio is calculated  to give a
measure of sustainable  government  consumption.
(b).  Projection  Period (1991-2005):
(b. 1)  For the terms of trade we use World Bank projection  data on international  commodity
prices to form the terms of trade ratios, and the corresponding  five years moving  average.
(b.2)  As before the 'sustainable' capital flows ratio is derived as a residual using identity
(8) above, given the following  two assumptions,  however:
(2.1)  The saving rate is given by the optimum  saving rate (column  (4) of Table 2).
1 Stitdy  speing,  unle  the projecton  period,  the resouc  balance  i  the hitorcd  paiod is wt behaviorally  liked to
the optimum aving  rate,  rather  it is obtined residuay as the 1S gap.v25-
(2.2)  The  is derived for an average GDP growth rate of 6% and ICOR assumed  to decline
from the current rate of 17% to almost 7  % by the year 2005.16  Five years moving averages  of the
residual of identity  (8) is then used as 'sustainable'  capital flows ratios.
(b.3)  For 'sustainable' government  consumption,  we use as before identity (9) above in
addition to the data on optimal  saving rate and private consumption. Private consumption  will be
predicted  by the following  two simple econometric  equations:
)  (GDP)  C  (52-)  03DP  )t  (14.7)  DUMY(1986-87)
R 2 =  0.54,  iR = 0.49, DW=  2.00
(11)  GDPTR  =  1304.43  4  42.  0  7 (19.4)  (6.2)
R2 = 0.52,  P  = 0.47,  DW - 1.28
t-statistics  in parentheses. Given the assumed  real GDP growth 6%, equation (10) and (11) allow  the
derivation  of future [iJ,  which together with the optimum  rate enable us to obtain  the 'sustainable'
government  consumption  ratios as residuals from identity  (9); which are subsequently  used to
construct  the five years moving averages.
1 6Ts  asumptionis  conssnwith  a reforuusedscnio,  wher  geaerrianc  onsm  and  mefium-waleenprise
as wei  as much  bee  srening  of publH  invedmet propawr is enviaged- 26 -
V.1  ERER and RER Misalignment:
Table 3 contains the data on 'susiMable' fumdan,atals along with the actual RER and its
ERER. The corresponding  data for the projection  period is presented in Table 4.  The ERER of
Table 3 is adjusted  so that its average over the 1979-82  period i  equal to that of the actual RER.
Over this period the economy  achieved  the highest  resource balance  ratio.  Table 3 also contains  the
percentage  real misalignment  computed  as: (RER - ERER)/  IRER * 100%.
According  to our calculations,  between 1982 and 1991  the accumulated  RER overvaluation  in
Babrain  could have been as high as 71.2%, which gives an annual average rate of real overvaluation
of 7.9  %.  It is remarkable  that such a high rate of real overvaluation  could happen  despite the deep
and sustained  real depreciation  experienced  in Babrain since 1984. The explanation  of this finding is
provided  by the even steeper depreciation  experienced  by the ERER, given the 'stinable'  evolution
of its fundamentals  - most notably  the optmm  saving rate - driven resource balance  (see also Fig.
(4)).  This finding also shows that anlysis of real exchnge  rate misalignment  based on historical
comparisons  of observed RER levels (i.e. PPP approach)  can be very misleading. It is also clear
from the graph and the table, that historical  RER (and real misaignment) is substantially  driven by
the oil cycle.'  TIhis  provides yet another indication  of the dependence  of Bahrain's economy  on the
oil sector, but it also illuminats the failure of domestic macroeconomic  policy in adopting  counter-
cyclical measures  to stem the oil driven tendency  towards RER appreciation.
Finally regarding the projection  period (1991-2005),  we turn to Table 4 (see also Fig. (4)).
The table shows an ERER index that continues  to decline  up to 1992 before rising very slowly - as
the 'optimum' saving rate declines and TOT improves. The ERER, however, remains low and below
60% for most of the projection  period. Now using the error-correction  equation (7), we can project
'7  Pat of RER  movemesta,  hower,  wa  ao  cewly  conumt  wid eq%iibm  behvier.-27-
RER  values  based  on a non-reform  scenario  for the next 14  years."' By comparing  thoe values  to
our corresponding  ERER,  we can obtain  the required  real  deprociton over the next 14 years
according  to the following  index:  (RER  - ERER)/RER  * 100%. The accumulad required  rea
depreciation  for the 1992-2005  period  i  estimated  at 31.2%, using  the above  formula. Should  a
nominal  currency  realignment  be considered,  the e_tmated  coefficien  of nominal  efcdve  exchae
rate (NEER)  in equation  (7) can be used  to compute  the corrspondig required  nominal  devaluation.
It is important  to emphasize  that  nominal  devaluation  in Bahrain  could  have  destabilizing  defct  on
the country's  financial  market,  a serious  concern  that has to weigh  enormously  in any such  decision.
1' In  iving the  fiu  RER idx  usig  equaion  (7),  we  _ame dooe  mc  o  pdoicy  i  _ndicatrs
(MX  G  NMzR)  to may at thdr  hioial  veg.  This laves  dhe  TOT index which u connuacd  fom  World
Bank  projecions.  Tho derivd  RER index is preled  in Table 4.Table 3:  BSAaIH
Equilibrium  RER  and RER  Uisaligr.ent
(NISTORICAL)
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  196  1969  1990
.......................................... 
......................................................................................... 
..........  Sustainable  Funddmntals
Oil  Vs  mon  Oil  Iorts  65.7  n.2  78.6  90.6  104.Z 112.0 109.9  95.1  84.1  75.0  69.3  67.4  70.2  70.0
Goverraint  Constvption
as Precentage of  0GP  (5)  14.7  14.3  14.3  14.8  15.4  16.4  18.3  20.6  22.5  24.3  25.6  26.3  25.5  24.8 Resource  Balance as Percentage
of  GDP  CX)  0.0  0.4  3.3  6.6  8.0  7.8  7.0  5.6  4.6  6.9  9.3 13.0  16.8  20.4 EquitIbriut  Real Effective  Exchange  Rate ................  .........................................
Actual  Real  Effective  Exchange  Rate  94.6 91.2  89.6 78.2 86.5 96.9  100.5  102.8  100.0  81.4 70.4 64.6  65.4 60.1 EquIllbrha  Real  Eff.  Exchange  Rate  89.7  89.5 84.9 84.6 88.5 93.4  97.1  94.7  90.8  80.5  71.6 62.8  55.5 48.0 Overvaluation  (X)  5.4  1.9  5.5 -7.5 -2.2  3.8  3.5  8.6 10.2  1.1 -1.7  2.8 17.8  25.1 .............................................. 
. ....  ..  ...  ........................  .....  .... Source:  Goverraent of  Bahrain,  IFS Yearbooks, and staff  estimates. Notes:
(a)  All  fund mentals  are  computed  as  5-year  moving  averages. (b)  TOT  fs  obtained  from  the  Vortd  Bank  projectons,  shile  sustainable  capital.  flos  and  goverremnt  expenditures  aS percentage  of  GOP  are  derived  estimates  consistent  with  adjusted  historical  saving  (see section  IV  of  the  text).Table  4:  BAHRAIN
Derived  Equilibrium  RER  and  Required  RER  Depreciation
(PROJECTIONS)
1991  1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998  1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 200K 2005 ..................................................................................................................................
Sustainable  Fundamentals
........................
Terms  of  Trade:
Oil  vs Non-Oil  Imports  71.7  71.9  69.2  70.1  73.3  77.0  81.1  85.3  88.7  90.3  91.0  90.8  89.8  88.9  87.8
Goverment  Consumption
as Precentoge of  GDP  (Z)  21.3  19.6  17.3  16.8  16.5  16.4  16.5  17.0  17.5  17.9  18.2  18.4  19.1  19.4  19.7
Rescurce Balance as Percentage
of  GDP  (X)  19.5  18.8  15.0  11.7  8.6  8.6  7.3  7.6  8.0  8.3  8.7  11.0  12.8  14.9  15.6
Real Effective  Exchange  Rate
............................
Actual  Real Effective  Exchange  Rate  58.4  52.6  49.6 48.4  49.1  51.3  53.2  54.9  55.9  56.3  55.7  54.6  52.2  48.8  45.3 Equilibrium  Real Eff.  Exchange  Rate  47.3  45.8  47.0  50.2  54.6  55.1  57.6  57.6  57.2  55.9  54.3  49.9  4.9  41.5  40.8
Required Real Depreciation  (X)  23.5  14.9  5.3  -3.6  -11.3  -7.4  -8.2  -4.9  -2.3  0.7  2.6  8.7  13.9  14.9  9.9
Source: Government  of  Bahrain,  IFS Yearbooks, and staff  estimates.
Notes:
(a)  All  fundamentals are  computed  as 5-year moving averages.
Cb) Capital  flows  and goverrmnt  expenditures as percentage of  GDP  are  derived  estimates  consistent  with  optimal  saving saving,  GOP  growth,  and assumed  behavioral  equations for  investment and private  consumption (see Section  IV).  ' (c)  Term  of  trade  data  are based an the World Bank projections.
(d)  ActuaL RER  is  projected  for  non-reform scenario  (see  1st  footnote  on Page 29)
Ce) Required real  depreciation  is  co  auted  as as CRER-ERERM)RER*1001.
Cf)  Capital  flao  as  percentage of  GDP  is  defined  as (N-X)/GDP 0100.Figure 4:  Bahrain:
Actual  and  Equilibrium  Real  Effective  Exchange  Rates
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VI. A Strat  for Maeonomic  Reform In Bahrain
In the preceding sections  of this paper, we have argued that the fundamental  most important
issue facing Bahrain today is the achievement  of high saving rates, commensurate  with the eventuality
of the drying out of the country's hydrocarbon  resource base, the mainstay of the economy.
Furthermore, the required saving rate will not be achievable  or sustainable  through pure expenditure
reducing  measures, that relies on reducing the absolute level of real private consumption. A
successful  adjustment  must be part of an elaborate  economic  reform progrm  aimed at restoring
economic  growth and diversifying  the economy  away from oil.  For the remainder  of this paper we
will briefly outline a policy framework  to achieve  these objectives.
Macroeconomic  Policy:
* The starting point is macroeconomic  policy, especially  fiscal policy.  A low fiscal deficit
that is financeable  on a sustainable  basis is the main prerequisite  for macroeconomic  stability. High
inflation  has been averted until now in Bahrain  despite  the high fiscal deficit (averaging  about 9% of
GDP over the last five years); due to a combination  of drawing from official reserves, extension  of
subsidies, and to lesser extent imposition  of price controls.  It is clear that if such process conines
in the future it will catch up with the economy  in a way or another.  For example, the country may
end up with diminished  foreign assets as its oil resource base continues  to decline, m the meanime
government  borrowing will multiply  - leading  to higher intest  rates-which  in turn will discourage
investment  and effectively  crowd out private sector investment. On the other hand, the goverment
may resort to external borrowing  to finance the deficit.  In both cases, the end result of such fiscal
instability  will translate into higher inflation  and possibly  to an unstable currency. Such a gloomy
scenario may seem remote but the recent experiences  of many Afican and Lati  American counties,
some of them oil producing, show that it can happen. For Bahrain, the ultimate target should  be a- 32 -
fiscal surplus given  the high saving rates required for the sustenance  of growth and economic  welfare
in the post-oil era.
* To achieve  higher saving rates both government  and private savings have to increase.
Since private saving is endogenous  to policy, the goveroment  must take the initiative  by reducing
expenditure  or raising revenue or both.  The reduction of government  expenditure  clearly contributes
to domestic saving, but it also has a direct effect on RER depreciation  which help reduce private
sector domestic  absorption. If government  revenues  were generated  through higher taxes, it will cut
directly on private sxtr  real wealth and hence current consumption. Focusing on government
expenditure,  casual evidence  seems to suggest that there exists a considerable  scope for achieving
substantial  reductions. Having emphasized  the need for and the feasibility  of reducing government
expenditure;  we must stress that this should not be allowed  to lead to an indiscriminate  slashing of
capital expenditure. Some key types of government  expenditure  on capital goods can be conducive  to
the process of RER depreciation,  and more importantly  they provide the necessary  requirements  for
higher future growth and enhanced  private investment.
- Ihe  other fiscal instrument  is the tax and subsidy  policy. In terms of direct subsidies, it
appears  that nonagricultural  subsidies  are of a rather negligible  magnitude,  currently estimated  at only
BD 2.0m.  Some direct subsidies  to agriculture  are designed  to protect local production from heavily
subsidized  products in neighboring  countries, especially  Saudi Arabia.  Given the difficulty for
Bahrain  to compete  with Saudi Arabia  on this score, and that the main cause of the low
competitiveness  of agriculture in Bahrain  may be due to the strong and possibly overvalued  currency;
we think that subsidies  to agriculture  should be carefilly considered, and especially  the subsidies  on
water charges since it encourages  unnecessary  depletion  of a valuable  resource for the country.
Furthermore, preliminary  evidence  suggests  that indirect  subsidies  may be quite substantial;  upon- 33 -
corrction of the incentive  structure  through  a more appropriate  real  exchange  rate, indirect  subsidies
could  be eliminated  which  should  have  positive  budgetary  implications.
* Given  the  justfied concernm  in Bahrain  about  malng  a tax system  comparable  to other
close  regional  competitors,  most  notably  Dubai;  it appeas that, otherwise  viable  types  of taxes  such
as income  and  profit  taxes  are not available  options. Ihe one  that  constitute  au option  is the sales
tax, which  in addition  to being  a nondistortionary  tax, it can yield  considerable  reveue.  The other
most  viable  source  of revenue  is cost recovery  and  service  fees;  given  their current  low rate and
small  coverage. At any rat,  in our view,  the guiding  principles  regarding  tax policy  in Bahrain
should  be; not  to make  the tax policy  a substitute  for much  needed  fiscal  me,  and  that it
should  not compromise  the competitives  of the economy. Thereo,  the tax should  not  be
excessive  or distortionary,  and  it should  be as minimal  and  as transparent  as possible.
Real Exciange  Rate Depdion:
* For a given  level of government  expenditure,  a depreciated  RER plays  an important  role in
reducing  real  private  expenditure.  More  importanly,  a depreciated  RER also  provides  the much
needed  econmy wide  signal  for resource  allocation;  which  can substantially  facilitate  the process  of
restructuring  and  growth  of the Bahrain  economy,  given  its open economy  and its relatively  developed
and functioning  markets. The asment  of the benefits  of RER depreciation,especially  when  it is
called  for by equlibrium  consideration;  should  be based  on dynamic  or forward  looking  criteria,
since  the enhanced  compedtiveness  of the economy  may allow  for the growth  and  expansion  of
curreny marginal  or nonexistent  sectors. For example,  a candidate  for possible  expansion  under  a
more  depreciated  RER in Bahrain  is agriculture  which  at present  comprises  less  than  1% of the GDP.
* Perhaps  it may  not  be difficult  to agree  on the need  for RER  deprociation  in Bahrain  given
the country's  sluggish  growth  performance,  the persistent  non-oil  negative  trade  balance,and  the-34-
negative  private  saving,  among  othors.  Thore  may  be some  controversy,  however,  regarding  what is
the appropriate  set of instruments  for achieving  RER  depreciation.  There  are two main  possible
options. The first  one is to use fiscal  policy  based  on a combination  of government  expenditure  cuts
and tax policy. Given  the large  magnitude  of RER  overvaluation  predicted  by our model,  the
required  fical ausity  may  be quite  severe. Experieneo  with such  types  of adjustment  show  that
they  tend  to be dow and  costly,  and  in most  cases  un  b.  This  has been  the case  in the
experiences  of Cote  d'Ivoire, Senegal  and other  CFA  fanc countries  (e.g.) Devarajan  ad  de Melo
(1990)  and Elbadawi  and  Msjd  (1992)). Despite  the dissimilarities  between  the economies  of these
countries  and  that  of Bahrain,  these  countries'  currency  like  the Bahrain  Dinar,  is also fully
convertible  and  is pogged  to a major  intrational  currency. 'urthermore, should  this strategy  require
high  taxes  then  it may  serioilsly  compromise  Babrain's  competitive  position  as a regional  buiness
center.
0 TIhs  leaves  us with  the other  option  which  is based  on both  fiscal  policy  and  a devaluation
of the nominal  exchange  rate.  Clearly  once  government  ependitue is sufficiently  cut and
mintned  at the new  level,  a nomina devaluation  can accelerate  the process  of adjustment  towards
the equilibrium  real  exange  rate, with  minimal  cost to the economy  in terms  of output  loss or
inflation. On  the other  hand,  however,  given  the strong  economic  interdepen  between  the GCC
member  countries;  a non-ordinated uateral  decision  to devalue  on the part of Babrain  is not
likely. The  other  main  concen about  a devaluation  based  economic  reform  is that  it may  endanger
the nominal  and  real stability  of the BD, a mater of great  concern  for an open  economy  such  as
Bahrain
* With  or without  a devaluation,  the success  of economic  reform  depends  on strong
sustainable  macroeconomic  policy  and the exstence  of flexible  factor  and  product  market. By
developing  countries'  standards,  only a few distortions  exits  in Bahrain's  economy. But  some  of-35  -
then distordons  lI  dhie  one  In the Idor muh,  as ugonfu  ad dter rmovad old  bave  hi
payoffs  for the economy.- 36 -
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E(t)  = Petroleum  extaction  rate
P(t)  = Petroleum  price  in real  terms
and  a dot over a variable  implies  partal derivative  relative  to time. Regarding  the optimality
conditions  for resource  extraction,  it can be shown  that  the following  hold:
E(t)>O  for  -9r
(2)  E(t)  = {
0  for  -6>r,
where  E( t)  is the maxaim  level  of e  ction.
That is as long as the rate  of increase  in the resource  price  is equal  to or exceeds  the real  rato of
return  on the reproducible  capital,  the optimal  extraction  rate will  be given  by the mam
allowable  by existing  technological  capacity.'9  World  Bank  projections  regarding  fuitur real  prices
of oil and  real rate of ret  on inational  invesmt,  les out  the case  ±>r,  since  oil prices
are projected  to remain  fixed  in real  terms. Based  on this and  the prevailing  view  on the technology
of oil production,  we now  state  the following  path  for real  prices  of oil and  for oil extraction  rates  in
Bahrain.
(3.1)  P(t)  - forallt
"Acallymm  fomaly  d:  E(t)  - E(t)  for  P<r  but  E(t)  >0  for  0,  awin
dis ler  c  Ihoe  oconomy  w  o  in  ft  fory  lev  <E( t)  s  E( t)  . In pric  hoWr,  it woWld  bo
opmal to extic  the namum  awmbl  by die pvilig  poducon  edhobgy.-40  -
f(O)  +E  s  (0) a -oA4  Os  t  SI5
(3.2)  Er(t)w  - j,,(o)  oel  15<  t  <T
_O  taT
where  is  (0)  is the current  (1990)  exractiod  rate from  the off-shore  Abu-Saafa  which  would
remain  at the present  level  of around  27 m. barrel  a year for the next 15  years  before  declining  by
about  6% before  drying  out after  T years. E,(O)  is the extraction  rate in Bahrain  in the base  year,
which  is assumed  to decline  at a rate  of 6% before  drying  out after 1S  years.Y0
'Me opdmal  policy  consists  of two phases: the oil phase  (0,T)  and  the past-oil  (C,"o).
During  the oil phase  the economy  aggregate  capital  stock  , X(t), consists  of two kinds  of assct:  the
exhastible resource  earning  discounted  back  to time t, i.e.,
r (4)  V(e)  P(a)  R(s)  e-"  de,
plus the non-resource  (reproducible)  capital  stock  K(t). Tbat  is:
(5)  XWt  - V(t)  + K(t)
using  (3.1) and (3.2)  the following  expressions  for V(t)  obtain: for t 5  15:
tmThm  _n_tas an  band  on dio Woa  B2k Bak=  CEM  Mims  au_mnmt of the oil  ctor.-41  -
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For  15 <  t  <  T:
r_ 
v(t)  - I  Pi.E,(0)  . a  do
(4.2)  - P. ET.(o) .e4(4  de
(0.065r)
This phase  wili be followed by the post-resource era,  Cr,oa),  during which capital
stock will accumulate according to:
(6)  k(t)  . C( L) ()  K(  t)  K(  t)
By involdng the standard result in the optimal growth theory that in the steady state
equilibrium consumption  and capital stock should grow at the same rate, we have:
7)  ^C(t)  - r-a  for  t>T  where  a
K( t)-42 -
is  the  rate  of  growth  of  te  opimal  lovd  of cnmptIon
Now  the  con  n  Steady  stao  (6)  ad (7)  dur  te  la  (0,  a  ) can  be manipulated
to obtain  the  fowing  optmal  pats for c_numption  and  capital  somatlon:
(8)  C(t)  - (r-o)  [V(o)  + J;J  e@- Os t  < T
(9)  KMt)w  l  C(t  - v(t)  O a  t  <  r
From  (7)  we  definm  th optma sav  ra  for  the  post-ofn era, deoted  by Ps(t):
(10)  PS*(M)  C  1-  C(t)  -r  °afoz  t  >T
TY  (t-)  z 
On th  other  and,  dming the rourcHo  1te  optma  avizS  ra e  meured  c  e  is
gm  by:
(11)  S(t)  - 1  - C()r
Note  tat  v()  an be  computod om  (4.1)  and  for  t  O (t) can  be  obotned  from (4.1)  or (4.2)
dependn on the  rang  of  t,  which  llow us to  omput  Ins  for C(t), K(t)  and then  the  opdmm
saving  rate  S(t).  To study  the  evoluton  of S(t) ove dmt, let us rewrite  th  expression  for S(t) as
follows:
(11)  '.()  1  (-0)  AO  0 zAOA  ( t)
(12)  AO - v(O)  + K(O)-43.
(13)  A ( t)  = e-Ot  [P  E( t)  -r  . v(  t)]
Now it can be shown  that
(.r-)A,dA  C  t)
(14)  ds*(t)  =  dt  so
dt  C.rA 0+A  (  ) 12
the sign  ds  (t)  follows  thesignof  At  . Iedotivadonof  dA  shouldboobtalned
for each  of the two ranges  for t.  Unfornotly  such  exrasons  ae raher messy  and their  sigs
depends  on the relative  magnitudes  of the paamm  involved.  Howner, it is likldy  that the optimal
saving  rate will  be declining  over time,' since  an  pproim  of the extaction  rate such  as:
Tr.e-A&  Oar-CT
(15)  3e  t)
taT
implies
v(t)  =  da
-c-
(16)  =  e.  tf  eG(-Of+z)s  do
=p06+r)  [e-(.OG*Z)t..e(.O6*)!'J
Hence,
21AdaIy this  is what  hs bappwened  in the  am of to puiul  aru  ow of  ddspaer, mn  Tab  (4)  of the  text-44 -
(17)  A(t)  e[  e-  (e06)  ete-  06']
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Also it is clear from (11) and (11') that
(19)  iT-  (t
where  I  is the optimal saving  rate in the post-oil  era (equation (10) above).2 This implies that
our derived optimal  saving ratios will have a left discontinuity  at t  =  T, which is consistent  with the
Figure 3 above.
nW  aWe  imenbtd  to Mr.  Hahimoto  fr point  hi out to us.Table  (A.1):  Bahrain
Setected Macroeconomic  and Sectoral  tndicators ..............................  ...................................  . .....  ...............................  ....................................................................... 
......................................  ..
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 ..................................  ............................................................................... 
...........................................  .........................................................  .............. GDP  Growth Rate (X)  -6.6  -7.5  8.5  4.9  -2.0  1.6  -1.2  7.3  2.5  1.2 GNP  Growth Rate CX)  -2.5  -7.9  8.2  9.9  -6.1  0.8  -9.1  5.7  -7.9  9.5
Sectoral  Growth Rates (X)
Agriculture  8.6  10.3  -1.4  -6.6  -7.8  6.8  2.4  -7.8  -6.7  0.9 Mining  & Cuarrying  -13.5  -37.4  2.6  12.7  -0.9  5.9  -10.6  2.0  3.3  3.7 Nwaufacturing  -7.6  6.3  10.8  10.9  -10.5  0.8  1.1  11.7  0.4  5.2 Electricity  4  Water  9.8  13.1  12.6  10.3  7.6  -16.1  2.8  10.0  26.6  1.6 Construction  -11.4  27.9  32.2  -1.1  13.2  -19.2  -2.7  13.6  -6.1  2.0 trde.  Hotels  & Restaurants  3.4  15.0  12.9  -18.4  -21.4  -5.5  13.6  14.7  -0.1  3.5 Transport  & Comumication  -6.3  17.7  4.4  5.0  -7.8  -12.4  -1.4  11.6  -0.8  -14.6 Finance & Real Estate  23.5  58.5  26.8  -2.1  7.9  -0.9  -18.9  5.9  -19.9  -6.0 Pubtlic  Adminfstration  -0.6  11.9  5.2  8.3  6.5  14.7  7.5  4.9  2.9  3.6 Others  31.9  84.3  32.0  -6.9  10.2  -5.8  -20.8  4.3  -36.2  -6.9
Sectoral  Distribution  of  GDP  (X)
Agriculture  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7 Crude Oil  4  Natural Gas  34.7  32.9  29.2  24.7  24.0  28.4  19.1  18.7  15.3  17.4  22.0 Manufcwturing  16.2  15.5  12.4  11.9  12.4  10.0  13.9  16.0  18.6  17.8  17.2 Electricfty  4  Water  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.8  1.8  2.1  2.0 Constructfon  7.0  8.1  9.7  9.8  10.7  9.6  1.6  7.3  7.1  6.5  6.4 Tra  de  Hotels  4  Restaurants  11.7  10.7  11.6  12.6  9.7  8.6  9.1  9.9  10.7  10.2  10.1 Transport 4  Cooufaicttfon  8.7  9.6  11.6  13.1  12.4  11.9  12.3  11.7  11.7  11.3  9.6 Finance & Real Estate  14.2  19.4  25.6  25.4  25.8  22.8  23.0  18.0  18.9  15.8  13.1 P"tic  Adeinistration  11.7  12.0  13.6  14.7  16.4  18.2  21.8  22.8  22.8  22.2  21.4 others  9.8  14.0  19.5  18.8  18.2  17.2  16.2  13.1  13.9  9.9  8.2
Cowosition  of  output  (X  GoP)
Resource Balance  10.0  11.3  11.3  3.5  3.0  5.6  4.1  6.5  9.8  5.3  14.5 Exports  of  OKFI  122.7  131.5  118.3  95.7  92.1  89.5  79.6  92.1  87.0  92.7  109.6 lIports  of  UFS  112.7  120.2  106.9  92.2  89.1  83.9  75.5  85.6  77.2  67.4  95.1
Total  Consumption  45.0  47.3  51.5  52.4  54.6  53.9  59.4  58.8  61.8  63.9  61.7 Governeent  13.0  14.5  17.0  16.1  20.6  22.5  26.1  26.1  26.9  26.5  25.8 Private  32.0  32.8  34.5  34.3  34.0  31.5  33.4  32.7  34.9  37.5  35.9
Gross Domestic investment  30.8  29.2  33.0  41.0  43.3  35.0  32.6  30.1  27.3  28.6  27.3 Gotvornent  13.4  11.2  12.3  15.5  14.5  12.2  11.8  9.6  8.7  8.1  8.5 Private  17.4  18.0  20.6  25.5  28.8  22.8  20.9  20.6  18.6  20.6  18.8 Change  in  Stocks  14.1  12.3  4.2  3.0  -0.9  5.4  3.8  4.6  1.1  2.1  -3.5
eMom  Item:
GDP  (1985 fixed  Prices)  1447.1  1350.9  1249.5  1355.4  1421.8  1392.8  1415.2  1397.8  1500.5  1538.0  1556.9 GNP  (1985 Fixed Prices)  1368.4  1334.4  1229.2  1329.8  141.6  1372.3  1382.8  1256.4  1328.2  1222.8  1339.1 5-Year IcOR  -42.6  38.5  17.2  17.2  19.7  12.3
Population  (Milions)  0.334  0.360  0.374  0.391  0.407  0.425  0.442  0.458  0.473  0.489  0.503 Per Capfta  CP  (0D)  3225  3576  3601  3528  3699  3232  2664  2377  2421  2280  2536 ..................................  ............................................................................. 
...................................................................  ....................................  . Source: Government  of  Bahrain.
October 8,  1992Table A.2:  Bahrain
Fiscal  erd  mtary  Irdicators .......................... ,  ...............................................................................  .......  ........................................................................................ 
............  1980  1981  1982  1963  1984  1985  1986  1967  19M6  1989  1990
A.  Agregte  Indicators:
Inflaton  C  Changes  In  CPI)  11.3  6.9  3.0  0.3  -2.6  -2.3  -1.7  0.3  1.S  0.9 Cnemr  Price  Index  82.0  91.3  99.4  102.4  102.7  100.0  97.7  96.0  96.3  97.7  96.6 CP  Deflator  (1985.100)  00.0  96.5  109.7  103.6  103.3  100.0  84.7  85.3  84.2  67.6  94.3 Nominal Dposit  Interest  Rate (K)  7.9  9.0  6.6  7.0  7.0  6.7  5.6  S.0  S.S  7.3 Interest  on Public  Debt (K)  2.1  3.2  2.3  2.5  2.4  3.3  3.6  3.6  3.1  2.6  2.6
B.  Owt Fiscal  Position  (Z GOP)
Total  gevem  end  Grants  36.5  41.2  40.4  34.9  34.8  36.2  35.5  35.6  31.6  32.5  33.9 oft  and  Gas  Rev  28.2  30.6  29.4  2.3  24.1  26.9  20.5  20.7  16.6  18.4  20.9 Eon-OI  Revee  S.4  6.1  6.9  6.3  8.1  8.6  11.8  11.9  12.2  11.5  11.2 rants  4.9  4.S  4.1  3.3  2.6  2.7  3.1  3.2  3.0  2.8  1.8
Total  Expeditures  27.4  29.2  34.6  36.1  36.0  35.7  39.8  36.2  38.2  36.6  36.6 Current  E  p  enItures  16.S  17.7  21.8  22.3  21.7  23.9  20.1  28.9  29.9  29.1  26.3 Govewrnent  SaWings  21.9  23.4  16.6  12.6  13.1  14.2  7.4  6.9  1.9  3.4  5.6
Capital  Expenditures  10.6  11.5  12.6  1s.6  14.3  11.8  11.7  9.3  6.3  7.7  8.3
Surplus  or sfficit  (-)  11.1  12.0  S.9  -3.2  -1.2  2.4  -4.3  -2.3  -6.4  -4.3  -2.7 let  Extrbudgptery  Operations  .S.2  -3.5  -3.5  -3.7  0.7  -1.3  -3.9  -6.7  9.2  -6.S  -6.4 overal  Surplus or  Deficit  (-)  5.9  L.S  2.3  -6.8  -O.S  1.1  -6.2  -11.0  2.6  -10.6  -9.0 ole  Financine by  Domestic SAnks  -0.4  -0.4  -4.9  3.8  11.9  .9.9  6.0  8.6  5.0  7.5  -0.6
Consolidated Public  Debt (2 GDP)  8.4  7.8  8.1  6.4  6.8  7.6  11.4  13.9  20.2  20.3  14.8 Domestic  1.7  1.s  1.5  2.1  2.0  2.2  5.S  6.6  15.3  16.0  11.0 for.Un  6.7  6.2  6.6  6.2  6.7  5.S  5.6  5.3  4.6  4.3  3.6
C.  Netary  A_regates  (C 0P)
I"  Non  y  16.6  19.1  19.S  17.6  16.3  17.5  19.7  20.?  18.9  17.4  17.6 N2  45.3  56.0  S6.9  60.0  56.4  64.9  73.9  61.3  79.8  78.1  63.4 NS  64.3  68.2  63.0  62.7  80.2  92.6  101.9  95.9  99.6  96.4  73.0
D. Balance of  Pa  yunt (NIn S)
Resource  alance  308.S  390.2  413.6  132.5  116.2  207.5  131.7  206.6  327.6  190.4  565.4 Net Factor  Incom  -211.9  -48.5  -60.0  -70.3  103.2  -54.6  -S6.7  -276.5  -311.1  -621.2  -509.8 Not  Current  transfers  -93.4  -106.6  -117.6  -102.1  -125.5  -234.8  -264.6  -243.6  -193.1  198.9  -272.3
Current Account Balance
(with  Official  Grants)  184.4  429.5  425.6  102.7  218.4  38.3  -68.9  -200.2  189.9  -129.8  242.1 Capital  Account  -237.7  -503.0  -71.1  -166.0  -35.7  -397.9  -73.7  -53.7  223.7  211.0  -400.0 Errors  *  Ouissions  396.3  662.7  -358.9  -45.2  -193.1  629.5  -35.6  -89.1  133.0  121.5  -194.7
Gross Reserves (Excl.  Gotd)  953.4  1544.1  1534.8  1426.4  1302.4  1659.7  1489.4  1148.5  1251.7  1050.0  1234.9
......................  ..............................  . ........................................  ............................................................................... 
............................... Source: Government  of  Bahrain.
October 8,  1992Table (A.3):  8ARAIN
Real Exchange  Rate and Its  FWanMdntats
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1964  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
.........  .......................  ....................  .............................................  ......  ............  ..  ..  .....  ................  ...  .. ..............  .. .
Real Effective  Exchange  Rate
...................  ................................
Real Effective  Exchange  Rate  94.6  91.2  89.6  78.2  86.5  96.9  100.5 102.8 100.0  81.4  70.4  64.6  65.4  60.1
Nominal Effective  Exchange  Rate  72.0  73.5  72.s  72.9  79.4  87.1  91.3  96.8  100.0  85.0  76.6  72.3  75.3  72.1
Fundmentals
Tem  of Trade M196100):
O01  Vs  bnOI1  lepotc  61.5  52.9  70.1 110.2 119.6 124.8 106.6  100.6 100.0 58.3  67.2  60.1  48.1  86.6
Gwrnnt  ConsAption
"  Preoent  of  GOP  (I)  14.4  14.6  14.9  13.0  14.5  17.0  18.1  20.6  22.5  26.1  26.1  26.9  26.5  25.8
Resource  Btance  s  Precentage
of  Sp W()  0.6  0.8  15.1  10.0  11.3  11.3  3.5  3.0  S.6  4.1  6.5  9.8  5.3  14.5
Sources:  Govenunt  of  drain,  IFS  Statistics, ad staff estietes.
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